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ing a field glass when examining a distant object. The observer may first place the big end of the instrument to his eye, with the result that he dwarfs the object. After reversing the instrument, further adjustment is necessary to make the focus exact. The eye, which for this purpose is analogous with subjectivity, is the medium of interpretation of course, but the object is the fixed quantity, and in the last analysis it is the object, not the eye, which determines the correctness of the report. Science is not made by subjectivity. Science is the output of subjectivity applying itself to the objective and correcting itself by progressive apprehension of the objective. If we attempt to make a science upon the contrary hypothesis, it reports reality, not in terms of itself, but in the form and moving imposed upon it by our subjectivity. It would require the courage of one's convictions thus to propose oneself as the norm of all external reality. It is too late in the history of science, however, for even such self-confidence to be taken at its own appraisal by cautious seekers after knowledge. Science is interpretation of reality by itself, not by that fraction of reality which comes to consciousness in myself.

Sociology has nothing to gain, but everything to lose, by ignoring the conclusions of the centuries about the limitations and restraints which must be enforced upon speculation, if it is to be kept serviceable. Speculation does not alter its character when we entitle it "subjective interpretation" or "ejective interpretation." It is the same anticipatory surmising, which may or may not prove to be in accordance with the facts. It should be added that many of Professor Giddings' propositions doubtless appear more dogmatic in cold type than they would seem in connection with his verbal explanations. I do not wish to exaggerate that element in his method, nor to depreciate the helpfulness of his fertility in speculation. My main contentions are, first, that the larger generalizations of sociology are not yet ripe for undergraduate consumption; second, that among investigators in sociology speculation should be welcome as a handmaid, but intolerable as a dictator.

ALBION W. SMALL.

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*The Psychology of Peoples.* Its Influence on Their Evolution. By GUSTAVE LE BON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898. Pp. xx + 236.

THIS translation of Le Bon's *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* (Paris, 1895) forms a sort of companion volume to the same

writer's *Psychologie des foules* (Paris, 1896), which a year or so ago appeared in English under the title of *The Crowd*. M. Le Bon may be described as an intellectual kodak fiend. His books are filled with snapshots at truth, interesting in themselves, but sadly unconnected, and out of focus. The volume under consideration purports to be merely a summary of conclusions reached in rather exhaustive special studies. It would be unfair, therefore, to criticise too harshly the apparently unsupported dogmatism and finality of judgment which pervade the book.

The argument is briefly this: Each people has a soul, not a mystical entity, but a community of sentiments and beliefs which are transmitted by physical and social heredity. These elements, predominantly emotional, constitute the popular character, which determines its political institutions, its arts, its religion. The intellectual life of a people is to be distinguished from its character. The former is easily modified; the latter relatively permanent. Indeed, the most striking thing about a psychological race is its fixity of character, which remains practically unchanged beneath what seem to be radical modifications of thought, dress, manners, speech, art forms, etc. Intellectual changes are, however, very gradually transformed into emotional beliefs, which thus slowly become a part of a people's character. There is progress in spite of apparent fixity, but this advance is only achieved by gradual accumulations of minute changes. The decadence of a people is due, not to loss of intellectual power, but to a disaggregation of collective character.

It is further asserted that races may be profitably classified only by their psychological character, *i. e.*, into (1) the primitive, (2) the inferior, (3) the average, (4) the superior. The delightful relativity of these categories is obvious. Again, the superiority of a race depends less upon the average it attains than upon the wideness of variation of individuals within it. The progressive races, therefore, are not approaching a Utopian equality, but are being constantly differentiated, and throughout the book M. Le Bon shows the antipathy to democratic institutions and the dread of socialism which are so conspicuous in *The Crowd*.

It may be said that this little work recasts into a sort of coherent system a great many opinions which have become commonplaces with philosophical students of history and politics. It says, cleverly enough, that governmental institutions are effects rather than causes; that prejudices and emotional beliefs are more potent than rational

arguments; that institutions cannot be transplanted from one people to another without undergoing radical changes. All these and many other things are restated in a somewhat new terminology, which gives them, perhaps, a touch of novelty, but they are interspersed with so many unwarranted generalizations that the book, as a whole, makes the impression of a brilliant, daring, but largely doctrinaire and untrustworthy body of personal dicta. Yet, in spite of all this, Le Bon deserves the credit of having indicated problems and outlined a system; a service which social psychologists will willingly recognize as valuable. The translation is anonymous, and apparently the work of a "hack." To say nothing of awkward English, misplaced clauses, and the like, one or two inexcusable blunders may be noted. The American "War of Succession" (p. xvi) (orig. *sécession*) is, perhaps, not so surprising from an English translator—the work was evidently done in London—but what can we say for this sentence (p. 195): ". . . a few Arab tribes, unified by the thought of Mahomet, conquered in a few years nations *who ignored their very names* . . ." (orig. "qui ignoraient jusqu'à leurs noms")?

GEORGE E. VINCENT.

*The Criminal Insane in the United States and in Foreign Countries.*

Report by S. J. BARROWS. Washington, 1898.

THIS Senate document has been prepared by one of the most competent men in the nation. It deserves the careful attention of all who are interested in humane treatment of irresponsible persons, and in the protection of society against those who are dangerous. This work should quicken the movement to provide in all states special asylums for criminals of unsound mind. It is a wrong to the ordinary insane to compel them to associate with lawbreakers in the state hospitals.

C. R. H.